IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THOMAS	NATHAN	LOFTIS,	SR.	*				
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Plaintiff,				*	Case	No.	17C	-295
				*				
VS.				*				
				*				
RANDY I	RAYBURN	,		*				
				*				
	Defe	ndant.		*				
				*	J	uly	10,	2017
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TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE KELVIN D. JONES

Transcript of proceedings

Transcriber: LAURIE MCCLAIN 615-351-6293

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1 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. 2 Please be seated.

3 MR. HORWITZ: Thank you.

4 MR. BLACK: Thank you.

5 THE COURT: Okay. This is the matter of Thomas Nathan Loftis, Sr., Plaintiff, versus Randy 6 7 Rayburn, Defendant, Case Number 17C-295, here today on 8 the defendant's motion to dismiss. And we have received the pleadings filed by -- by both defendant 9 10 and plaintiff.

11

All right. Please.

12 MR. HORWITZ: Thank you, Your Honor. Good 13 afternoon, Daniel Horwitz of the Nashville Bar. I'm 14 here with my co-counsel, Mr. Alan Sowell, on behalf of 15 the defendant in this matter, Mr. Rayburn, who is with 16 us here today as well.

17 We're here this afternoon on Mr. Rayburn's 18 Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint For Failure 19 to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.

20 Your Honor, I am well aware that in the 21 typical case when a defendant comes up here and stands 22 before you and tells you that there are eight separate 23 reasons why a plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed 24 it usually means there are only one or two good ones. 25 Respectfully, Your Honor, this is not a

1 typical case. And there are, in fact, eight separate 2 reasons why the plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed 3 outright and should never see the light of the day.

To begin, though, I do want to note that this is a defamation case, and that defamation complaints are subject to heightened scrutiny at the motion to dismiss stage because of their capacity to chill free speech.

9 As a result, our Supreme Court and our Court 10 of Appeals have held repeatedly that the preliminary 11 question of whether a statement is capable of a 12 defamatory meaning presents a question of law to be 13 determined by this Court.

Precedent also dictates that courts owe no deference whatsoever to a plaintiff's own characterizations of the allegations in his complaint, which is crucial in this particular case because the article at issue simply does not say what the plaintiff claims it says.

Further, to avoid frivolous litigation over statements that a plaintiff merely finds annoying, offensive or embarrassing, a statement must also hold a plaintiff up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, and carry with it an element of disgrace before it can legally be deemed actionable.

For this Court's convenience, we have attached a very thorough and recent opinion offered by Judge McClendon to our motion to dismiss, that details the heightened scrutiny that applies to defamation cases. And I have an additional copy here as well if it would be useful.

Your Honor, this plaintiff's complaint in this
case contains two overlapping theories of relief: The
defamation by implication claim, and a false light
claim.

Defamation by implication carries all of the elements of defamation. And our Court -- Court of Appeals has observed that there is also significant and substantial overlap between false light and defamation. Because the plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy all or even most of the elements of either theory, however, his complaint should be dismissed.

18 The first fatal deficiency of the plaintiff's 19 complaint is that he has sued the wrong person. Any 20 defamation claim requires a plaintiff to prove that the 21 defendant communicated the defamatory statement rather 22 than somebody else.

In this case, the plaintiff's complaint is
premised upon a single news article attached to it as
an exhibit. Critically, that article makes clear that

it was written by Jim Myers and that it was published
 by the Tennessean.

Mr. Rayburn, for his part, was not even quoted in the article and no statement contained in the article is attributed to him. Thus, having neither written the article in question, nor published it, nor even been quoted in it, Mr. Rayburn is simply the wrong defendant.

9 The second fatal deficiency in the plaintiff's 10 complaint is that the vast majority of the statements 11 that he complains about do not even reference him. Let 12 me just read some of the statements the plaintiff has 13 sued over, verbatim. Here's the first one:

14 "Rayburn recognized the need for qualified 15 line cooks in Nashville every day in his kitchens of 16 the old Sunset Grill, Midtown Café, and Cabana, so he 17 decided to do something about it by dedicating himself 18 to helping build the Culinary Arts Program at what used 19 to be called Nashville Tech."

In addition to being completely innocuous, I respectfully submit that the statement contains no mention of Mr. Loftis whatsoever.

23 Statement two: "Rayburn will tell you that 24 helping build the Culinary Arts Program at Nashville 25 Tech hasn't been easy." Same problem, innocuous

1 statement and no mention of Mr. Loftis at all.

Here are the next two: "When Rayburn enlisted 2 3 the help of local restauranteurs and chefs to offer 4 feedback on the program and the quality of its 5 graduates, the reports he got back weren't flattering. And if the election had gone a different way it might 6 7 have affected funding for the school." 8 No mention of Mr. Loftis in these statements 9 Simply put, nearly all of the statements that either. 10 the plaintiff complains about do not even reference 11 him. His -- his complaint fails as a result. 12 Your Honor, the third fatal defect in 13 Mr. Loftis' complaint is that none of the statements in 14 the article is even remotely capable of a defamatory 15 meaning, as a matter of law. 16 As noted earlier, whether the statements in 17 the plaintiff's complaint are capable of a defamatory 18 meaning is a guestion of law for 19 Your Honor to decide on its own following an 20 independent review. 21 As a result, I urge Your Honor just to take a 22 look at the article itself rather than the plaintiff's 23 fantastical characterizations of it which bear 24 absolutely no resemblance to reality. 25 As the plaintiff himself characterizes the

1 article, though, his complaint still fails as a matter 2 of law. The plaintiff essentially advances two 3 arguments on this point. First, he claims that the 4 article makes him out to be -- and I'm quoting here --5 "incompetent." Second, he claims that the article 6 implies that if his brother-in-law had been elected 7 mayor, it might have caused him to retaliate.

8 The problem is that precedent establishes very 9 clearly that calling someone incompetent is a 10 nonactionable opinion. We've cited half a dozen cases 11 that stand for that proposition, which I have here as 12 well.

13 I'll just read the holdings. This is American 14 Heritage Capital versus Gonzalez, 436 S.W.3d 865: "A 15 statement expressly calling someone incompetent is a 16 nonactionable statement of opinion."

Another, 190 S.W.3d 899: "A statement implying a coworker is incompetent is not a statement of fact, but rather a nonactionable opinion."

This is 750 F.2d 970, this is out of the DC Circuit, citing precedent that concluded that "the term 'incompetent' as applied to a judge was too vague to support a claim of liable."

24 This is 823 S.W.2d 405: "References to 25 appellant as incompetent are assertions of pure

1 opinion. These terms of derision considered in context 2 are not capable of proof one way or the other. 3 Therefore, as to each of these statements the absolute 4 constitutional privilege applies." 5 This is 299 Ill. Appellate 3d 513: "Fired because of incompetence is a nonactionable opinion. 6 7 There are numerous reasons why one might conclude that 8 another is incompetent. 9 One person's idea of when one reaches the 10 threshold of incompetence will vary from the next

11 person's." In some -- calling someone "incompetent" -12 which it should be emphasized the article does not
13 actually do -- is not actionable.

14 The plaintiff's second allegation fails for 15 the same reason. Simply stated, a hypothetical 16 assertion about what someone might have done in the 17 future if a different reality had unfolded is also 18 nonactionable. We've cited half a dozen cases in 19 support of that proposition as well.

And it's also worth noting that the subject of the hypothetical prediction here is the plaintiff's brother-in-law Bill Freeman, who is not a party to this case, and Mr. Loftis cannot sue on his brother-in-law's behalf.

25 Your Honor, the fourth fatal problem with the Loftis v. Rayburn 7/10/17 Transcribed by LAURIE MCCLAIN 615-351-6293 plaintiff's complaint is that none of the statements could have been made with reckless disregard for their falsity. We know this because in this extraordinary case the plaintiff does not even allege that any statement in the article is false. And that failure probably makes this lawsuit unprecedented.

7 In fact, rather than claiming that the 8 statements at issue were false, the plaintiff himself 9 actually believes that they are true. For example, the 10 plaintiff himself pleads that he was fired. He also 11 pleads that the board that terminated him received 12 complaints about the quality of his program's graduates 13 from local chefs.

Simply put, the plaintiff cannot premises a defamation claim of a false claim -- false light claim on statements that he himself acknowledges are true.

17 The fifth problem with the plaintiff's 18 complaint is that it could not plausibly have injured 19 his reputation. Tennessee law requires that statements 20 be read as a person of ordinary intelligence would read 21 them.

22 With all due respect to opposing counsel, here 23 no person of ordinary intelligence would or even could 24 have inferred the fantastical meanings that the 25 plaintiff is claiming. Nothing in the article comes

even close to holding him up to public hatred or
 disgrace. As a result, the article is not actionable.

The sixth fatal defect of the plaintiff's complaint is that the statements at issue are not capable of being proven false. Opinions cannot be proven false, nor can hypothetical predictions about future events that never transpired.

8 And as noted before, the plaintiff is not even 9 alleging that anything in the article was false. He 10 actually admits that the most critical statements that 11 he's complaining about are true.

12 The seventh fatal deficiency in the 13 plaintiff's complaint is that Mr. Rayburn is immune 14 from this lawsuit because he is a public official. 15 Nashville State Community College Foundation is a 16 public entity that is under the purview of the Board of 17 Regents. It is a public foundation incorporated under 18 Tennessee's Public Foundation Statute, and Mr. Rayburn 19 is a member of it.

And despite his protestations, Mr. Loftis has previously acknowledged this fact. We know that because his demand letter to the Board of Regents just a few months before this complaint was filed said as much.

25 Quoting from that demand letter which I have Loftis v. Rayburn 7/10/17 Transcribed by LAURIE MCCLAIN 615-351-6293 here as well, "The circumstances and context of these remarks strongly suggest that Mr. Rayburn was speaking on behalf of the college and he served on the board at the time."

As a result, I simply ask this -- this Court to reach the uncontroversial conclusion that the plaintiff said what he meant and meant what he said in the demand letter that he sent to the Board of Regents just a few months before this lawsuit was filed.

Eighth and finally, the last fatal deficiency in the plaintiff's complaint is that it is time barred by the statute of limitations due to the Single Publication Rule.

14 The plaintiff himself pleads the statements 15 that give rise to this complaint had previously been 16 made or discussed during meetings at which several 17 people, including a Tennessean reporter, were present.

Under the Single Publication Rule the statute of limitations begins to run when such a mass publication is first communicated. Because the communications referenced in the article took place well over a year before the plaintiff's complaint was filed his claims are time-barred.

24 I recognize the plaintiff's counsel has 25 attempted to respond to this problem by asserting that

1 the Single Publication Rule is difficult to fathom. 2 Respectfully, Your Honor, it is nonetheless the law in 3 Tennessee, and his complaint is untimely because of it. 4 In closing, Your Honor, this is not a case 5 involving a false allegation of criminality, or drug use, or a bribe, or a false claim that someone 6 7 deliberately endangered a child. 8 Instead this is a case involving a grown man 9 who is upset about being terminated and is angry that the circumstances of his term -- termination were 10 11 accurately reported by the Tennessean. That is not 12 false light, and it is not defamation. The plaintiff's 13 complaint should be dismissed as a result. 14 Thank you, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 16 MR. BLACKBURN: Your Honor, Gary Blackburn 17 with the Nashville Bar. Your Honor, I think you've 18 previously met Mr. Kroll, who is an associate in our 19 office. But I wanted to introduce Your Honor to 20 Mr. Alex Hines. 21 Mr. Hines? 22 Mr. Hines is a Rising Senior at Hume-Fogg. He is an intern at my wife's General Sessions Court. 23 She's out of town this week, so I thought if I brought 24

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him over here and let him watch what real lawyers do,

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he'd be dissuaded from this whole idea of pursuing a
 legal career.

3 THE COURT: Well, welcome. 4 MR. BLACKBURN: May it please the Court, 5 if I can start with this interesting argument that the statute of limitations has run. I'm aware of no 6 7 authority in Tennessee that does not say that the 8 statute of limitations commences -- the period 9 commences at the time of the publication of the 10 defamatory language attributed to the particular 11 defendant was published.

12 There is no question here about what -- when 13 that was. The article is attached. There's no 14 argument made that this complaint was filed in more 15 than a year from the date of that publication.

I could point out initially that, although I don't think the letter that I wrote -- which was an attempt to avoid this -- which should have been accepted by rational people -- was a demand letter, as it is characterized by counsel. That means it was expressly privileged, it was settlement discussions, and under the Rules of Evidence cannot be considered.

And I would raise that objection again today
in the context of this motion. However, the things
that were said were not attributed to Mr. Rayburn at

1 the time those things allegedly were said.

2 And the complaint points out that Mr. Loftis' 3 personnel file was devoid of any of these; never a 4 single person to whom these comments, if they were 5 made, were attributed, nor was any explanation given. Now, he was told that his year-to-year 6 7 contract would not be renewed. Mr. Loftis could have made some claim under some other theory. A failure to 8 9 renew is a violation of the law if it's based upon an 10 illegal purpose or intention such as age discrimination, race, gender, and so forth. We didn't 11 12 contend that. His contract was non-renewed. 13 He chose the graceful approach at that time 14 and resigned in the -- in the face of having been told 15 that he was being -- his services were being terminated 16 at the end of that contract period. None of this 17 implicates the statute of limitations whatsoever. 18 Counsel has cited some foreign cases, some 19 Texas cases. Interestingly, he hasn't discussed any of the false light cases that have been cited in our 20 21 breach -- our brief. In fact, the first motion that 22 was filed in this case did not even mention false light or defamation by implication. 23

24 Defamation by implication would trigger some25 of the standards of defamation. I think that's true.

False light does not necessarily do so. What has been quoted in these cases and has been essentially adopted in spirit by our courts is the Restatement (Second) of Torts 652(e), which says -- I have a copy of this --I'm not sure if we provided that or not, but I do have a copy:

7 "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the 8 9 public in a false light is subject to liability to the 10 other for invasion of his privacy if, A, the false 11 light in which the other was placed would be highly 12 offensive to a reasonable person; and B, the actor had 13 knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the 14 falsity of the published -- the publicized matter and 15 the false light in which the other would be placed."

16 Interestingly, in the comments, the committee 17 comments to the restatement under Subsection B it 18 stated, "It is not, however, necessary to the action 19 for invasion of privacy that the plaintiff be defamed. 20 It is enough that he be given unreasonable and highly 21 objectionable publicity that attributes to him 22 characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false and 23 so is placed before the public in a false position." 24 Now, the cases that are cited by us that are 25 truly false light cases include, most notably, the one

1 involving former Judge Eisenstein and Channel 5 News. 2 In that case, Judge Eisenstein was asked a number of 3 questions. The manner in which he responded to those 4 questions tended to suggest -- or so he alleged -- that 5 he had intentionally hired a person in a -- in a capacity with his court who was not qualified to have 6 7 that position, the -- the -- the sense being that the application for funding made to the United States must 8 9 have been false because this person had not yet 10 achieved this degree or qualification for which he should have had. 11

12 That was dismissed in the trial court here in 13 this county. There was a great deal more to it than 14 that. But that very part was dismissed, and the Court 15 of Appeals reversed because it placed Judge Eisenstein 16 in a position of placing him in a false light, as a 17 person who, even though he was a judge, could have been 18 capable of misstating things to the United States or to 19 some -- some agency.

20 One of the curious cases had to do with the 21 woman who was a flight attendant -- not a flight 22 attendant, excuse me -- a -- a clerk, you know, one of 23 these persons that allows you to board. And things 24 were said to her by a customer, and this was published 25 later. Frankly, if I had been Judge Binkley I

1 think I would have granted the motion too. Just -2 just sounded like a dustup at the airport; pales in
3 comparison to what we've been seeing on the news in the
4 last little -- little bit.

5 But the Court of Appeals said, no this 6 reflected upon her, reflected upon her -- her work, and 7 on her reputation in that -- in that work. That is 8 important because before we were scheduled on the last 9 occasion, we filed two cases, supplemental authority, 10 and furnished those to opposing counsel.

11 One of those was McWhorter versus Barre -- I 12 quess it's pronounced -- B-a-r-r-e. In this case a 13 person had stated that the plaintiff was unfit to be a 14 pilot. The Court of Appeals said -- this is a 2003 15 case -- in this case: "The letter was capable, without 16 doubt, of being understood as defamatory, constituted a serious threat to the pilot's reputation as a pilot, 17 18 the only career plaintiff has ever known."

19 So that was considered sufficient in terms of 20 the allegation in the complaint, that it was a threat 21 to the only career he has ever known. That's exactly 22 what our complaint alleges, that these comments, 23 attributable to Mr. Rayburn, constituted and in fact 24 have been a threat to the career in culinary programs, 25 which -- which was the only thing that he had known.

This case also rejects the idea that opinion -- that opinion evidence, despite what Texas courts may hold, is automatically subject to protection. Now what this case says is that's not true because it has to do

5 with a failure to disclose non-defamatory facts.

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6 So if one says that, "In my opinion, John 7 Smith is a liar," by placing the words "in my opinion" 8 in front of that statement, that's insufficient, 9 because in order to conclude that John Smith is a liar, 10 then it's necessary for there to be facts from which 11 that has been established, which were not disclosed.

12 That's precisely what we -- what we have here. 13 Your Honor, the -- the idea that an opinion is 14 protected in Tennessee is simply contrary to our -- our 15 law.

16 This is in the Zius case that was also
17 submitted: The Court said that, "Opinions are not
18 automatically protected by the United States
19 Constitution."

The restatement, followed by the Supreme Court in Milkovich -- the US Supreme Court, position is that: "An opinion may be actionable if the communicated opinion may be reasonably be understood to imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts justifying the opinion." So those factors are not really at play

1 in this case.

2 One of the things that has not been discussed 3 here by counsel is his standard under Rule 12. These 4 are discussions of things which might have more 5 meaning, and Your Honor may be in a better position to determine them, if this were on a Rule 56 motion. Not 6 7 only do we not have discovery, we don't even have an answer filed in this -- this case yet, only these --8 9 these motions. 10 The complaint alleges things that in the context of this discussion today are true. That is to 11 12 say that the sense of a Rule 12 motion is: Here's all 13 of these things, assuming for the sake of my motion, 14 their truth, their accuracy, then you still haven't 15 stated a claim. That concession not only has not been 16 made, but the absurd argument has been made that 17 somehow Mr. Loftis has -- has agreed with these various

18 things. That's -- you won't find that in the

19 complaint.

As to whether this involves Mr. Rayburn, I'm not going to discuss it further, but I have a factual basis for those statements based upon a conversation that I've had with -- Mr. Rayburn will recall. But in this article it states -- it -- it quotes Mr. Rayburn as stating that, "It hasn't been easy" -- that is, his

work in the -- in this business. "When he sought the help of local restauranteurs and chefs to offer feedback on the program and the quality of his graduates he was"--THE COURT: Wait, now, which quote, again? MR. BLACKBURN: I'm sorry. It's on Page 15 -excuse me -- Paragraph 15 of the complaint. Now, we attached the entire article to the--THE COURT: I have the article. But where in the article is the quote, again? MR. BLACKBURN: Okay. Well, let me -- I was reading from the complaint. Let me turn to that, which is Exhibit A. Your Honor, let me -- since we're returning to the article, if I may, if I could go just chronologically as--THE COURT: Sure, sure. MR. BLACKBURN: -- those -- as it's stated. On the very first page, where the Exhibit A is marked, in the third paragraph from the end, it states -- Mr. Myers states that he's "written before about the

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20 -- Mr. Myers states that he's "written before about the 21 dearth of qualified line cooks in town, from our best 22 restaurants to the hotels and convention centers that 23 need to feed the burgeoning throngs," et cetera. Now, 24 obviously that is a statement that Mr. Myers is 25 attributing to himself. No disagreement there.

Then the next paragraph states, "Rayburn recognized this need every day in his kitchens at the old Sunset Grill, Midtown Café and Cabana, so he decided to do something about it, dedicating himself to helping build the Culinary Arts Program at what used to be called Nashville Tech."

7 That's the program that Mr. Loftis had served 8 for many years as the chief of. They didn't call him a 9 dean -- I'm not sure what his title was, but he was in 10 charge of that program. He graduated from that program 11 and had fewer than 50 students when he began, and had 12 over 300 students by that time.

13 The -- he says -- this is the in next 14 paragraph, it says, "To honor him, they named the 15 school after Mr. Rayburn." Then the next sentence 16 says, "However, Rayburn will tell you it hasn't been 17 easy." Now, we've alleged in this complaint that the 18 words that are here such as this are Mr. Rayburn's 19 words told to Mr. Myers and published by him.

For our purposes today, that's an assumed fact. If we were here on a Rule 56 motion, we might have some dispute over that. But there is no dispute today in the context of a Rule 12 motion. "When he enlisted the help of local restauranteurs and chefs to offer feedback on the program and the quality of its

1 graduates, he reports that -- the reports he got back 2 weren't flattering. The program was simply turning out 3 ungualified students."

Now, we have had an entire program universally
turning out unqualified students, so that every person
who graduated from or who had taken classes there and
left and went into the food industry were unqualified,
every single one of them.

9 On the next page it says that, "In the face of10 this crisis," he says, "Rayburn didn't flinch."

11 THE COURT: That's -- but that's not what it 12 says, though. Is that -- is that the suggestion? 13 MR. BLACKBURN: I beg your pardon?

14 THE COURT: The suggestion that the program 15 did not turn out qualified students?

16 MR. BLACKBURN: Yes. He said--

17 THE COURT: "The program was simply turning 18 out unqualified students," and so that's your--

MR. BLACKBURN: Yeah. "The program was simplyturning out unqualified students." So--

21 THE COURT: Exclusive -- exclusively?
22 MR. BLACKBURN: That's the only thing that
23 could be inferred from these words. It says, "When he
24 enlisted the help of the local restauranteurs and chefs
25 to offer feedback on the program and the quality of its

graduates, the reports he got back weren't flattering.
 The program was simply turning out unqualified
 students." There's no qualification to that statement
 in the article.

5 THE COURT: Is that Mr. Rayburn's statement, 6 or is this the statement of the -- the chefs who 7 provided this -- this feedback, their reports?

8 MR. BLACKBURN: This is -- this is a statement 9 that Mr. Rayburn made, according to the complaint, that 10 was then published. He is characterizing -- he is 11 characterizing what he says that he has heard from 12 unidentified people. So there are additional facts yet 13 to be discovered. I understand the distinction, but we 14 have to have discovery to resolve that distinction, if 15 that's the case.

But the next sentence is: "In the face of these" 'charges' -- we'll call them, these statements that are made -- it says, "Rayburn didn't flinch, because a career of running successful restaurants teaches you how to cut losses and to move on quickly." And then it talks about having the name on the building and his involvement.

The next sentence -- paragraph says -- now, he's not flinching. What's he going to do because he's hearing these reports? Is he going to investigate it?

Is he going to determine the truth of that? Is he going to say, "Tell me the names of these people"? Is he going to determine that they even graduated from there? No. What he says, and this article is: "They started by cleaning house from the top by removing director Tom Loftis."

Now, the only inference that could be made is is that you have a problem. It's being said that the program is turning out incompetent people, or unqualified people, and that Rayburn didn't flinch, and he's going to confront this, and the way to confront this is by removing Tom Loftis.

13 It then says, "It was a politically"--14 THE COURT: Now, wait, but it says -- it 15 didn't say -- he says "they." Who's the "they" in 16 "They started by cleaning house"?

MR. BLACKBURN: Well, they're describing him as the -- as the voice of the school, as the board, as the -- the person for whom the school is named -named. And the next paragraph begins with, "Rayburn's group knew they needed fresh blood." That's what they knew.

Now, is he stating an opinion that's someone else's that he dissents from? That's not what the -not what the article says. He is not distinguished

1 from these things at all, and he's the one that was -2 who -- who is described as not having flinched at this
3 difficulty.

Now, for the purpose of -- of Rule 12, I think
a fair inference from this is that Mr. Rayburn was the
person behind the dismissal of Mr. Loftis, but this is
not an employment case. This is a false light case.
And even if this is the -- this happens to be the words
of other people, it's Mr. Rayburn who's passing this on
to the press, to the great embarrassment of Mr. Loftis.

11 We -- in -- in a false light case, in most any 12 defamation case, you can't cherrypick phrases or 13 sentences; you have to look at the whole thrust of the 14 article and what impression did it create. The 15 impression this creates is that a school that Loftis --16 Mr. Loftis was in charge of was turning out incompetent students and that the only way to remedy this was by 17 18 getting rid of Tom Loftis.

19 It then says that -- the "cleaning house," is 20 what this uses. Now, I mention this because it was 21 mentioned by counsel: "It was a politically 22 inexpedient move last year, since Loftis was the 23 brother-in-law of Bill Freeman who was running for 24 mayor at the time. If the election had gone a 25 different way, it might have affected funding for the

1 school."

Well, now, that's -- that's a patently false statement. Nashville State is a State of Tennessee entity. Mr. Freeman was running for mayor. Metro does not fund Nashville State -- or Nashville Tech, before it.

7 And so Mr. Rayburn, in not flinching, is
8 taking on this imaginary threat that Mr. Freeman might,
9 in retaliation for what he was doing, remove funding
10 from an entity that didn't receive Metro funding. Now,
11 why would that be in there?

12 The complaint alleges that the motivation in 13 part behind what was done was that Mr. Rayburn had 14 sought a position in Mr. Freeman's campaign and was not 15 offered the position that he thought was appropriate, 16 and he had hard feelings about that.

Now, I'm not taking sides as to whether -who's right or who's wrong in that. But it does supply
some sort of motivation and it explains why this odd
comment would be made in the middle of this paragraph.

Now, in any sort of defamation or false light claim, if actual malice can be proved, of course, this would be something from which a reasonable person could find actual malice. But whether that's actual or not, stating things that are false, that a reasonable

inquiry would prove to be false or that you know to be false, implies malice at law -- to satisfy that element, if that element is involved. That is true in malicious prosecution cases; it's true in every sort of lawsuit in Tennessee that involves malice, actual or implied.

7 This says that "Rayburn's group -- they knew 8 they needed fresh blood." And then they started this 9 search to find someone with fresh blood. Now, the 10 fresh blood, that could have given -- it could have 11 been some evidence of age discrimination. That's one 12 of those

13 so-called stray comments that's argued in every age 14 discrimination case in which that's used. That's not 15 material in this case. It does mean somebody other 16 than -- than Mr. Loftis.

17 Now, the idea that every fault of every person 18 who works in the restaurant community of this town --19 which is exploding -- it was exploding then -- is 20 incompetent, is absurd on its face. The idea that if 21 that were true itself that that is the fault of Tom 22 Loftis and it only -- can only be cured by someone who 23 does not flinch, by starting at the top and by removing the person at the top, plainly gives rise to the 24 25 inference that it's his fault, that this is the case.

Your Honor, I saw -- I saw, and -- and mentioned earlier in the year that even in January, I believe it was, there were over 90 new restaurants scheduled to be opened. Now, these probably would have included the fast-food franchises and so forth.

8 But the Court can take judicial notice that 9 this town is exploding with restaurants, new 10 restaurants. It is inconceivable that every single 11 person is a graduate of Nashville Tech and that every 12 single one of those persons is incompetent, and it is 13 therefore the fault of Tom Loftis because he was in 14 charge of that -- of that school.

The demand letter that's been attached here is plainly a suggestion that there be a means to resolve this case short of litigation. Initially there was interest expressed in that. And then the meeting which I requested was declined by the president of the school.

The idea that he is a state employee, that is, Mr. Rayburn is or was a state employee apparently did not occur to the Attorney General's office, which expressly denies it. If Mr. Rayburn is a state employee, where is the Attorney General today? The

Attorney General would be here making this argument if
 that were the case.

3 We allege, because it's simply true, that 4 Mr. Rayburn is not a state employee; that they've not 5 furnished any response that says he's been paid by the State employ -- the -- the State of Tennessee, from the 6 7 State Treasury; that he is on any program of -- of benefits or retirement or any of the other things that 8 9 state -- to which state employees are allowed to 10 participate. That argument is -- is difficult to 11 understand.

But at least the State of Tennessee doesn't look at it that way. And we've alleged that he's not a state employee -- for the purpose of this motion today, he's not a state employee.

Now, if he -- if in the context of a Rule 56 motion he wants to offer sufficient evidence to show that he is a state employee, then Your Honor will be compelled to -- to look at it again. But based on what we have here today, that's -- that's an absurd sort of argument.

The idea, based on the cases we've cited, that is a person is unfit for what he's doing, is directly held by our courts -- not Texas -- our courts, to be an actionable statement. Now, is it possible in the -- in

1 the fullness of time that Your Honor may see evidence
2 that causes you to question that or that a jury might
3 look at this and cause -- and -- and be caused to
4 question it based on Your Honor's charge? That's
5 entirely possible.

6 But we're here today with a publication that 7 described basically as unfit and absurdly responsible for things for which he could not possibly be -- be --8 to which could not possibly be attributed to him, a 9 10 good and decent man who's done no harm to anybody, and 11 who had resigned quietly, who had not filed a charge of 12 discrimination, who acted with grace, and as a 13 gentlemen.

And then he is singled out for a publication to say, "Here's the problem, we've got to fix it. We started by getting rid of Loftis." Totally unnecessary, unseemly, ungentlemenly, and defamatory, based upon facts that aren't here, facts that won't be here.

Now, all of these restauranteurs that have been named, many of whom are well-known, none of those persons have been quoted. None of those persons are specifically involved. None of those persons are said to have insisted on removal of Mr. Loftis or any other change at the program.

1 The idea -- oh, before I forget it -- the --2 the opinion that was attached from Judge McClendon, the 3 -- the facts in that are totally separate from these. 4 Those facts happened in the context of a political 5 campaign. I've been involved in litigation involving unpleasant statements made in a political campaign. 6 7 And our courts and our appellate courts just aren't going to deal with those right now. And I don't blame 8 9 them.

But the person who was the plaintiff in that case was a public figure. The measure, the standard under which these comments are judged are totally different for a public figure. This is where the Constitutional issues most likely arise.

Can we make a negative comment about a public official? There is, really, I don't think, any other right more thoroughly protected by our constitution than the right to -- to criticize our -- our government or specific leaders, some of whom I wish would understand that today.

But the fact is is that those are public officials, and if they bring a lawsuit based upon criticism of them, they have to show far more than a nonpublic official -- no one has -- or public figure -no one has alleged that Mr. Loftis was a public figure.

Of course, they haven't alleged anything. All they've
 done is respond to a complaint. The complaint says
 that he was not, and he plainly was not. He was a man
 who was entitled to his privacy.

5 And having been -- had a digni -- let them get 6 their way and have a dignified departure, he's then 7 publicly humiliated in -- in -- in words that 8 reflect upon his career and what he has done, and the 9 only thing that he has known, just as this pilot was in 10 the case that I've cited, which was a Tennessee, not a 11 Texas case.

So I respectfully submit, Your Honor, that we read this as a whole, and if we read this in the context of the -- of the restatement, and the comments in the restatement that I began with, then I respectfully submit that a dismissal of this on a Rule 17 12 motion, based upon our pleading, is not sustainable.

This could be a different circumstance in a Rule 56, when Your Honor would have the answers to the questions that you've ably asked. We don't have those answers. We only have the allegations of the complaint.

I believe the responses, when they are discovered, will be favorable to Mr. Loftis, but I've been surprised many times over 45 years, so it's not

1 impossible that that will occur. But Mr. Loftis 2 deserves the right to have discovery in this case, and 3 to meet these defenses as they have been raised, which 4 are most -- mostly based on -- on countervailing 5 allegations of fact, such as the one about whether he's a state employee. 6

7 So we respectfully submit that the -- the 8 motion should be granted. We should be permitted to 9 commence discovery in this case, and this can be revisited another time when Your Honor has more than 10 11 just a complaint, which for our purposes today is 12 presumed to be true. Thank you.

13 THE COURT: Thank you.

14 All right. Mr. Horwitz?

15 MR. HORWITZ: I'll be brief, Your Honor. I 16 think the greatest difficulty here that the plaintiff 17 has is that he wants the article to be Mr. Rayburn's 18 words, but they are clearly not. It is an article that 19 is reported about him, that is not his article, that he 20 did it not publish.

21 He also wants the article to contain salacious 22 allegations and inferences. They just aren't in there 23 when you actually read the article itself.

24 It was stated that we did not touch some of 25 the false light claims that the defendant has claimed

1 do not apply here. And we did. As noted, this is not 2 a case involving false allegations of criminality or 3 drug use by a pilot, or a bribe accepted by someone, or 4 a claim that a flight attendant deliberate --5 deliberately endangered a child -- nothing remotely like that. This is simply a case of an adult who was 6 7 terminated and is upset about it, and is now here for 8 that reason.

9 Opposing counsel stated that the plaintiff does not agree with any of the claims that we've said 10 11 he agrees to. Just quoting verbatim from his own 12 complaint, admitting that in October of 2014, Dean Karen Stevenson and the director from the Southeast 13 14 Campus claimed to have been contacted by local chefs 15 with concerns regarding the qualifications of program 16 graduates.

He also admits that in March 2015, plaintiff was informed the decision had been made not to renew his contract at the conclusion of the academic year. That's what this case is about. He admits that these statements are true; they are not actionable as a result.

He stated that there was not a single case
known to counsel in which the Single Publication Rule
has been adopted in Tennessee. Several cases are cited

1 in our pleadings: Apple White versus Memphis State 2 University, 495 S.W.2d 190, says: "The Single 3 Publication Rule, the statute of limitations accrues at 4 the time of the original publication. The statute of 5 limitations runs from that date." These statements were made well in advance of this article being 6 7 published, they've been out in the public domain for 8 years. The statute of limitations has run, as a 9 result.

Your Honor, opposing counsel described 10 Mr. Rayburn as "the voice of the board," in the context 11 12 of this article. At the same time they're trying to 13 claim he's not a government employee. I do note that 14 the statute under which we sought fee shifting here 15 allows the Attorney General to represent a defendant or 16 the defendant to hire private counsel. Fee shifting is 17 appropriate in both cases when a government official is 18 sued in their capacity as such and -- and the -- the 19 complaint turns out to be dismissed.

Also note that the objection that counsel raised to the addition of the demand letter to the board, first of all, has not been raised in the plaintiff's pleadings, number one. Number two, the plaintiff himself attached half of that correspondence to his own complaint. We have a rule of completeness

in the State of Tennessee. We are entitled to include
 the first half of that correspondence with the Board of
 Regents.

Something about judicial notice was said. If we are going to do that, I'd just like to flag the fact that Nashville State Community College does receive funding from Metro. There were two public articles that we -- we noted in our -- in our response. The first one is from the Tennessean.

10 The title was, "Mayor Dean Proposes Pay Raise, \$520 Million in New Projects," and it contains the 11 12 statement, "This plan calls for \$2 million to now --13 allow Nashville State Community College to launch a planned satellite campus." There is also press release 14 15 from Nashville State thanking Mayor Berry for -- and 16 then hoping that she continues her support for 17 Nashville State Community College.

I do also want to note one final thing about the -- the demand letter that was sent, and the -- the same statements that were echoed in a Nashville Business Journal publication from a couple of weeks ago.

23 The point of this lawsuit is to coerce
24 government action. The plaintiff would like Nashville
25 State Community College to honor him. The notion that

1 this is not a complaint against a government official 2 when the whole point of it is to -- to result in 3 government action is, I -- I respectfully submit, 4 difficult to swallow. 5 We respectfully request that this complaint be dismissed and that fees be awarded as a result. 6 7 Thank you. 8 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take a 9 few minutes and we'll be back shortly. 10 COURT CLERK: All rise. THE COURT: Should be about 10 minutes. 11 12 (Recess taken.) 13 THE COURT: Okay. Again, this is Thomas 14 Nathan -- Nathan Loftis versus -- oh, Sr. -- versus 15 Randy Rayburn, defendant, Case Number 17C-295. 16 Let me see -- as a factual background, Thomas 17 Nathan Loftis has brought this action for defamation 18 and false light, invasion of privacy, against Mr. Randy 19 Rayburn -- Rayburn, based upon a newspaper article 20 written by Jim Myers and published in the Tennessean on 21 or about March the 2nd, 2016. The article was entitled -- or titled, 22 23 "Tennessee Flavors Offers Way to Eat, Drink, Aid 24 Cooking Arts." Plaintiff claims that the article

25 contains statements spoken by the defendant, and that

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7 consequence has been unable to find comparable work in 8 Nashville, Tennessee.

9 We are here today on the defendant Randy 10 Rayburn's Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 11 Procedure, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended 12 Complaint for Failure to State a Claim For Which Relief 13 Can Be Granted.

14 And pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee 15 Rules of Civil -- Civil Procedure: "A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears that 16 17 the plaintiff can prove no set of facts -- can prove 18 that no set of facts in support of the claim that would 19 en -- entitle him to relief -- a motion for -- motion 20 to dismiss challenges only the legal sufficiency of the 21 complaint."

Now, the question of whether something is
capable of conveying a defamatory meaning presents a
question of law for the trial court. A trial court may
determine that a statement is not defamatory as a

1	matter of law only when the statement is not reasonably
2	capable of any defamatory meaning, and cannot be
3	reasonably understood in any defamatory sense.
4	And when considering whether a statement is
5	capable of being defamatory, it must be judged within
6	the context it is made. Additionally, it should be
7	read as a person of ordinary intelligence would
8	understand it in light of the surrounding
9	circumstances. To this end, the courts are not bound
10	by the plaintiff's interpretation of the alleged
11	defamatory material. And if the words do not
12	reasonably have the meaning plaintiff ascribed to them,
13	the court must disregard the plaintiff's
14	interpretation.
15	Under these circumstances, the Court finds
16	that the statements made were not defamatory as a
17	matter of law, and therefore the defendant's motion to
18	dismiss for failure to state a claim is hereby granted.
19	And that will be the ruling of the Court.
20	All right, Mr. Horwitz, please prepare an
21	order. And tax costs to the plaintiff.
22	All right. Thank you all.
23	COURT CLERK: All rise.
24	(End of recording.)
25	* * * * *

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    COUNTY OF DAVIDSON )
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